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Sloan: Federal Civil Rights Legislation and the Constitution

FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION AND

THE CONSTITUTION
FRANK K. SLOAN *

Various delaying tactics, including much argument about
changes in the United States Senate's rules on debate, would
seem to indicate that new Federal Civil Rights legislation will
be one of the last items acted upon by this session of the
Congress. But it seems certain that some action will be taken
-to pass new civil rights legislation, particularly with the widespread opinion that civil rights planks contributed much to
the Democratic victory in 1948.
Certain it is that the matter may not be disposed of by
labeling it "campaign promises". Perhaps the most vocal
group of agitators in the nation's recent history are this
generation's champions of federal civil rights legislation. This
discussion is found as much in recent legal journals and law
reviews as it is in other periodicals,' and the heated and
rather biased approach of much of it is a noteworthy sign
that the campaign seems to have made headway even in the
traditionally conservative legal profession. Unfortunately,
much of this discussion appears to have been guided by ardor
-for a "cause", 2 rather than by desire for an evaluation of
the worth of such legislation.
For.this reason, a sober reflection upon the constitutional
aspects of federal civil rights legislation seems justified here.
Legislation likely to be considered in the Congress might
be listed as (1) Abolition of the poll tax as a prerequisite
to voting, (2) a federal fair employment practices act, (3) an
anti-lynching act, and (4) an act or acts abolishing segregation of races.
*Member Richland County Bar. Associated with Columbia firm of Cooper & Gary.

1. See Seegert, Racial Segregation in Educational Institutions, 46

Mich. L. Rev. 639 (1948); Green, the Bill of Rights, etc., 46 Mich. L.
Rev. 869; Stark, Application of 1st Amendment to State Action Through
the 14th Amendment, 121 So. Cal. L. Rev. 61; Fraenkel, The Federal
Civil Rights Laws, 31 Minn. L. Rev. 301 (1947); Clark, A Federal Prosecutor Looks at the Civil Rights Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 175 (1947).
2. Negro Disenfranchisement, A Challenge to the Constitution, 47

Col. L. Rev. 76 (1947).
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While generally it might seem that all of such acts would
be open to the same constitutional questions, it is with the
latter two that this article concerns itself principally.
Under Article I, section 4 of the Constitution and the
15th Amendment, the Congress appears to have ample power
to pass the anti-poll tax measure, and opposition to the legislation on Constitutional grounds would seem greatly
weakened thereby.
The proposed federal fair employment practices act has
at least one powerful precedent for Constitutional validity
in the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the Fair
Labor Standards Act.2 This decision, however, as well as those
on which it was based, relied upon the power of Congress to
regulate commerce. The Supreme Court, on fair employment
practices legislation, might well evade the knotty civil rights
issue by basing the authority for such legislation upon that
power.
But the anti-lynching and racial segregation legislation,
which would of necessity require federal police enforcement,
in procedure if not in fact, face squarely the problem considered here. Are segregation and anti-lynching laws valid
under the "privileges and immunities" clause? Does the Congress have the Constitutional power to delineate by legislation
what the "due process of law" shall be? Does it have the
right to legislate the "equal protection of the laws" which the
states must afford, and to enforce those acts by exercise of
police power within the states?
Or more briefly, did the 14th Amendment remove from
the states, or from the people acting through their states,
local control of and local procedural methods for the solution of local police problems?
Despite 76 years of firm denial by the Supreme 'Court
that the 14th Amendment intended any consequence so inimical to the Constitutional theory of local self-government
as federal control of the police power, the Court split 5-to-4
in 1947 on the question of including the procedural provisions
of the Bill of Rights within the purview of the 14th
Amendment. 4 A change of one vote in the Court could have
opened the door to the Congress to define local procedure for
3. United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941).
4. Adamson v. People of California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947).
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the States, or at the least to make the Supreme Court the
"perpetual censor" of state legislation mentioned in the
Slaughter-Housecases. 5
As is pointed out in a recent discussion of the Adamson
case, 6 this fear of making the Supreme Court a perpetual
censor on state due processes is not so important in any of
these cases as the Court's unwillingness to permit Congress
to legislate away our dual form of government. Adherence
to the line of the Court's decision in the past 80 years would
preserve the underlying concepts of the Constitution as to
local control of local government, and prevent the tearing
up "by the roots much of the fabric of the law (procedural)
7
in the several states."
The court has consistently followed the rationale of Mr.
Justice Cardoza in Palko v. Connecticut,8 that only the
fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights are secured against
state action by the 14th amendment.., those rights that are
"of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,".., leaving
to the states the problem of local procedures. But the upholding of this position by a 5-to-4 margin at this late hour
should flash a warning stop-light in the face of those who
have implicit faith that local process, and eventually local
law, will not one day be written and enforced by the federal
government.
While the Court's practice of judicial self-restraint, as
well as 80 years of decision on the point are a steep wall for
civil-rights advocates to climb, the Court since its revamping
in 1937 has consistently upheld federal legislation. Were the
Court presented wvith accomplished federal acts expanding
the effect of the 14th amendment into local police matters,
the constitutionality of those acts might be upheld. It is the
purpose of this article to examine the 'constitutional reasons
why such acts as anti-lynch laws or racial segregation laws
might not be valid.
The fifth section of the 14th amendment flatly authorizes
the Congress to enforce the amendment by appropriate legis5. 16 Wall. 36 (1872).
6. Kolher, Due Process, Purpose and Scope of the 14th Amendment,.
21 So. Cal. L. Rev. 47 (1947).
7. Mr. Justice Frankfurter for the majority in Adamson v. Cal.,

8upra.
8. 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
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lation, therefore the problem turns upon the meaning, the
inclusions and the, exclusions, of the amendment.
It is submitted that a sober consideration of the decisions
of the Supreme Court in all the years before and after the
adoption of the 14th amendment, display a conviction that the
preservation of local control of local affairs is an indispensable requisite to the continued existence of our democracy.
The Constitution was young when the Court decided that
a general power is given to congress to pass all laws necessary
and proper to carry into execution powers granted by the
Constitution to the government. 9 Yet, while affirming one of
those early enabling acts, the Court said:
"We are by no means to be understood in any manner
whatsoever to doubt or to interfere with the police power
belonging to the States in virtue of their general sovereignty. That police power extends over all subjects within
the territorial limits of the States and has never been
conceded to the United States."'1
This limitation on the Congress' power to-act was also
applied to Congressional attempts to regulate trade within
states, as an interference with the police power of states to
regulate internal affairs."
The famous Slaughter-House cases' 2 in 1872 were the first
Interpretation by the Court of the 13th and 14th amendments, adopted as an aftermath to the Civil War. These cases
were the foundation stone for the construction and interpretation of the new amendments, decided within a few years after
their adoption. There the Court held that the state of Louisiana had the right under its police power (exercised to protect
the public health) to place all slaughtering in the hands of
monopoly control, and that the action by the state did not
deprive plaintiff butchers of their rights without due process.
The Court declared that the police power was unquestionably in the states before the 13th and 14th amendments and
declared that the function of these two amendments was
9.
10.
11.
Witt,
12.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16. Pet. 539 (U. S. 1842).
License Cases, 5 How..504 (U. S. 1847), followed in U. S. v. De9 Wall. 41 (U. S. 1869).
16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1872).
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to liberate and give full citizenship to the Negro race. The
Court, through Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out that the first
section of the amendment defined for the first time a citizen
of the United States, and said "it is only the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States which are placed
under protection of the federal Constitution." He pointed
out some of the privileges and immunities of the U. S. citizens: (1) Right to deal with and seek the protection of the
U.S. government, (2) Free access to all seaports in all states,
(3) Right to use the courts of the several states, (4) Right
to care and protection of the U.S. while in foreign jurisdiction
or on the high seas, (5) Right to peaceably assemble, (6)
Right to petition for redress of grievances, (7) Right to writ
of habeas corpus, (8) Right to move on the navigable waters
within the U. S., and (9) Right to become a citizen of any
state by residing therein.
The Court then said that among the privileges and immunities of state citizens were (1) Right to protection by the
state government, (2) Right to acquire and possess property,
and (3) Right to pursue and obtain happiness. It is clear that
this definition leaves the daily pursuits of each state's citizens,
in particular their relations-with each other, within the purview of state control. The Court sdid that these rights of
state citizens were subject to- restraints for the good of the
4
13
whole, citing Corfield v. CoryeU, and Ward v. Maryland,1
and that it was not intended that Congress acquire the police
power of states as to the rights of their citizens by the
adoption of the Civil War amendments.
"Was it the purpose of the 14th amendment, by the simple
declaration that no state should make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States, to transfer the security
and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned from the states to the Federal government? And
where it is declared that Congress shall have the power
to enforce that article, was it intended to bring within
the power of Congress the entire domain of- civil rights
heretofore belonging eiclusively to the states?
13. 4 Wash. C. C. 371 (1823).
14. 8 Wall. 180 (U. S. 1868).
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The Court then cited the tremendous power this would give
the Congress to restrict and control state legislation and
police authority.
" . . when, as in the case before us, these consequences

are so serious, so far-reaching and pervading, so great a
departure from the structure and spirit of our institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the state
governments by subjecting them to the control of Con-

gress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally
conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental
character; when in fact it radically changes the whole
theory of the relations of the state and Federal governments to each other and both of these governments to the
people .

We are convinced that no such results were

intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by the legislatures of the states which ratified
them."' 5
Although there was, no doubt, an intention on the part of
many Congressmen that such be the purpose, at least to the
extent of requiring the states to comply with the complete
provisions- of the Bill of Rights,16 the Court -was clear that
such was not the intention of Congress as a whole, nor of
the states.
"But, however pervading this sentiment, and however it
may have contributed to the adoption of the Amendments
we have been considering, we do not see in those Amendments any purpose to destroy the main features of the
general system. Under the pressure of all the excited feeling growing put of the war, our statesmen have still believed the existence of the states with power for domestic
and local government, including the regulation of civil
rights, the rights of person and property, was essential
to the perfect working of our complex form of government, though they have thought proper to impose additional limitations on the states, and to confer additional
power on that of the nation."' 7
15. 16 Wall. 36, at p. 78.
'16. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908), and the- dissent in
.Adamson v. California, supra.
17. 16 Wall. 36, at p. 82.
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The Court pointed out that the due process and equal
protection clauses of the 14th amendment placed the same
restrictions on the states as the 5th amendment placed upon
the federal government, and that the fifth section of the 14th
amendment gave the federal government the power to enforce compliance and halt discrimination by states. But state
oppression is necessary to invoke theprovision, and the Court
again said:
"We doubt very much whether any action of a state not
directed by way of discrimination against negroes as a
class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to
come within the purview of this provision."
In the years that have followed the Slaughter-House decision, the Court and the Congress have found the restraints
of the original Civil Rights Statutes, 18 and the power of the
Court (to review the acts of states discriminating against
citizens, Negro or otherwise) quite sufficient to bring about
a gradual and non-violent evolution of social and economic
equality for the races, without endangering our system of
government by concentration of police power in Washington,
and without engendering the strife which accompanies forced
social revolutions.
In 1875,19 the Court reaffirmed the duty of the states to
protect the civil rights of their citizens. It was "the very
highest duty of the States, -when they entered into the Union
under the Constitution" to protect all persons in the enjoyment of those "unalienable rights with which they were endowed by their Creator." "Sovereignty, for this purpose, rests
alone with the states." The Court stated emphatically that the
14th amendment added nothing to the rights of one citizen
against another, and gave the-federal government no power
to prosecute for crime within a state.
In one of the first actions against a state official" the
Court pointed out that the action must be state action before
the 14th amendment became operative, but confirmed the
18. The Civil Rights Bill, Apr. 6, 1866, 14 Stat. at L. 27; The modifled Enforcement Acts, May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. at L. 140; The Civil
Rights Act, March 1, 1875, 18 Stat. at L. 3, 336.
19. U. S. v. Cruiksbank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875).
20. U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 (1876).
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power of the Congress to protect by legislation the rights and
immunities created by or dependent upon the Constitution.
Further, the Court said that this police power which had not
been surrendered by the States "cannot be contracted or bartered away" by them. 21
In 1879, the functioning of the various Civil Rights acts,
and the capability of the Court to interpret the 14th amendment to the full protection of the Negro race was illustrated
three times. In Strauder v. West Virginia,22 a state statute
barring Negroes from jury duty was held invalid under both
state and federal Constitutions, and that section of the Civil
Rights Act allowing removal to federal courts where the petitioner cannot secure equal rights in state courts was held
valid under the fifth section of the 14th amendment. In Ex
parte Virginia,23 the Court pointed ont that the State was not
discriminating against Negroes where the state statute required all male voters to serve on jury, and the jury list included Negroes, even if the jury actually drawn had no Negroes. On the other hand, in another action in the same state2 4
decided at the same time, a Virginia state judge was held
properly convicted under the Civil Rights Act 25 for discriminating against Negroes by systematically excluding Negroes
from jury lists which he controlled. The Court asserted the
overriding power -of the 14th .amendment as against the
State's action in local matters where the action involved
discrimination.
It is this ability and willingness of the Court to prevent
discrimination that presents the most powerful argument
against the proposed Congressional invasion of state police
21. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25 (1877).
22. 100 U. S. 303 (1879).
23. 100 U. S. 313 (1879).
24. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1879).
25. The sections considered here were part of sections 1977 and 1978
of the Revised Statutes (Acts of Apr. 6, 1866): "All persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens; and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses and exactions of every kind, and to no other." Also held valid
was section 641 allowing removal of causes, civil or criminal, to U. S.
Circuit Courts in cases of discrimination in the state courts.
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powers. As the Court said in the same year,26 the 14th amendment's equal protection clause does not limit the states' power
to set up such courts with such jurisdictions as they see fit,
so long as all citizens in each jurisdiction are subject to the
same rules and laws. Nor does the 14th amendment place the
control of local courts and their jurisdiction in the Congress.
Discussing this police power generally, the Court said in
188027 that the power extends to all matters affecting the
public health, safety and morals, and that the states may exercise proper police power, limited only by Constitutional restrictions against impairment of contracts, discrimination,
and other prohibited action, citing Beer Co. v. Massachusetts,
28
supra, and Patterson v. Kentucky.
In 1883 the leading cases supplementary to the SlaughterHouse cases were decided, and those parts of the Civil Rights
Acts which prescribed punishment by the Federal government for discrimination by individuals (a direct invasion of
state police power) were held unconstitutional. In the Civil
Rights cases, as they are labeled, 29 the Court held that the
fifth section of the 14th amendment did not give the Congress
'power to legislate upon subjects reserved for state protection,
but only to provide relief against state action which might be
contrary to the provisions of the amendment.
What was the subject on which the Congress had attempted to legislate? Racial segregation3 0... the very type of
statute the civil-righters urge the Congress to enact today.
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bradley, again
pointed out that the 14th amendment applied only to discrimination by state action, and that the Congress may not de26. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22 (1879).
27. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814 (1880).

28. 97 U. S. 501 (1877).
29. 109 U. S. 3 (1883).
30. Civil Rights Act, March 1, 1875. Sec. 1. "That all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters and other
places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limita-

tions established by law and applicable alike to citizens of every race
and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude."

Sec. 2 pro-

vided fines for violations and $500 redress to the individual deprived of
the enumerated rights.
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lineate private rights or set up such civil rights statutes as it
sees fit to take the place of state statutes:
"Such legislation cannot properly cover the whole domain
of rights appertaining to life, liberty and property, defining them and providing for their vindication. That
would be to establish a code of municipal law regulative
of all private rights between man and man in society.
It would be to make Congress take the place of state
legislatures and to supercede them. It is absurd to affirm
that, because the rights of life, liberty and property
(which include all civil rights that men have) are by the
amendment sought to be protected against invasion on
the part of the state without due process of law, Congress
may, therefore, provide the due process of law for their
vindication in every case; and that, because the denial by
a state to any person of the equal protection of the laws
is prohibited by the amendment, therefore Congress may
establish laws for their equal protection. In fine, the legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt in this behalf is -not general legislation upon the rights of the citizens, but corrective legislation ... for counteracting such
laws as the states may adopt or enforce . .
The court then pointed out that such "corrective" sections
of the Civil Rights Act as those approved in Strauder v.
W. Va., and Ex Parte Virginia, supra, were valid for the reason that they reflected the true purpose of the 14th amendment, to protect against abuse by state action.
The dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan, was an able and vigorous one. 31 It followed the theory that the Constitutional pro.
vision should be pursued liberally so as to permit the Congress
to give the fullest effect to the 14th amendment. This theory
combined with the view of Mr. Justice Black in the Adamson
case in 1947 (that the original intent was that the amendment
include all guarantees of the Bill of Rights-procedural and
substantive-within Congressional control) is the theory still
relied- upon by those now urging further Congressional
action.3 2
31. 109 U. S. 3, p. 16; 3 S. Ct. 18, p. 33.
32. Fraenkel, The Federal Civil Rights Laws, 31 Minn. L. Rev. 301
(1947).
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The Court's strong re-affirmation of the decision in the
Slaughter-Housecases, has been followed by an unbroken line
of decision to the present day, holding the position firm.
In the same year, 33 the Court restated the position that the
accused may not demand a jury composed wholly or partly of
his race, but only that they be properly included in jury lists
and not excluded by state law or action of state agents.
The next year 34 the Court upheld the power of the states
to pass burdensome police regulations, if they were necessary
and proper and applied to all persons in the same class
equally:
"But neither the amendment (14th)-broad and comprehensive as it is-nor any other amendment, was designed
to interfere with the power of the state, sometimes
termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to promote health, peace, morals, education and good order of
the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries
of the state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth
and prosperity."3 5
430 (1890).

In 1865 the Court held that the Constitutional prohibition
against State impairment of the obligation of contracts 36 does
not prevent full exercise of the police power by the states,
37
even though contracts are affected by police regulation.
In 1891 the Court declared38 "it must be regarded as settled" that by the 14th amendment the powers of the states are
not limited, except that no state can deprive particular persons, or classes of persons, of equal and impartial justice under the law. Further, that law, in its regular course of administration through courts of justice, is due process, and
when secured by the law of the state the Constitutional requirement is satisfied; and that due process, is so secured by
laws operating on all alike, and not subjecting the individual
to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unre33. Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110, 1 S. Ct. 625 (1883).
34. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 S. Ct. 357 (1884).
35. Quoted with approval, in re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 10 S. Ct.
36. Const., Art. I, Sec. 10.
37. New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. La. Liglt Co., 115 U. S. 650, 6 S. Ct.
252 (1885).
38. Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, l1'S. Ct. 577 (1891).
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strained by the "established principles of private right and
9
distributive justice," citing Hurtado v. California.3
Again in 1891 the rules of the Slaughter-House and Civil
40
Rights cases were cited and reaffirmed.
In 1894 the Court pointed out in sharp language
that the
14th amendment cannot be availed of by "every unsuccessful
litigant in the State court," but redress from valid yet burdensome state laws must be had from the legislature. 4' The
Court approved Chief Justice Taney's broad definition of the
state police powers in the License cases,4 2 and announced an
43
equally broad definition.
On the other hand where there was actual infringement of
the 14th amendment's protections, the Court stated flatly that
the prohibition extended to any authority or person acting
under authority of the State, refusing to allow the party
guilty of discrimination to escape on the technical ground of
4
his scope of authority.
In 1905: Protection of the health and safety of the people
is the reserved power of the States, "there can be no doubt."4
It was not until 1908 that the novel Bill of Rights approach to the inclusions of the 14th amendment was considered in detail.4 6 Twining had been convicted of fraud in a
bank examination proceeding, and the Judge in his charge
commented upon the defendant's failure to take the stand and
-deny the charges against himwhich is a practice permitted
in New Jersey. On appeal to the Supreme Court Twining asserted that his immunity from self-incrimination had been
invaded by the state, for it was a "privilege or immunity"
guaranteed to him by the 14th amendment as a citizen of the
United States, on the theory that the first eight amendments
(the 5th involves the privilege against self-incrimination)
were made applicable to the states by the 14th amendment.
Mr. Justice Moody announced the opinion, which the majority followed in the Adamson case last year, and which
39. 110 U. S. 516, 4 S. Ct. 111 (1884).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 S. Ct. 865 (1891).
Rwy. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 14 S. Ct. 437 (1894).
5 How. 504, 583 (1847).
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 449 (1894).
Rwy. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 17 S. Ct. 581 (1897).
Lieberman v. Van deCarr, 199 U. S. 552, 26 S. Ct. 144 (1905).
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14 (1908).
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was followed by Mr. Justice Cardozo speaking for the majority in Palko v. Connecticut, in 1937. 47 Justice Moody said:
"The 14th Amendment withdrew from the states powers
theretofore enjoyed by them to an extent not fully ascertained, or rather, to speak more accurately, limited those
powers and restrained their exercise. There is no doubt
of the duty of this court to enforce the limitations and
restraints whenever they exist, and there has been no
hesitation in the performance of the duty. But whenever
a new limitation or restriction is declared, it is a matter
of grave import, since, to that extent, it diminishes the
authority of the state, so necessary to the perpetuity of
our dual form of government, and changes its relations
to its people and to the Union."
He then pointed out that the 14th amendment "did not
forbid the states to abridge the personal rights enumerated in
the first eight amendments," many of which are procedural,
and many of which would be unnecessary limitations on State
sovereignty, whereas these amendments were most proper
limitations on the central federal government.
Then the rule, which Mr. Justice Black styles the "natural
law" rule of interpretation of the 14th amendment, was set
out. It is, briefly, if the Court under the 14th amendment
forbids a state to infringe personal liberties guaranteed as
against the federal government by the Bill of Rights, it-will
do so not "because these rights are enumerated in the first
eight amendments, but because they are of such a nature that
they are included in the conception of due process of law",
that their abridgement would be a violation of the
.amendment.
The desire of the majority in the Twining and Palko decisions was the same as that of the majority in the Adamson
decision, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter: (1) Not
to infringe upon the rights of the states in the exercise of
their police powers by pressing upon them the specific requirements of the first eight amendments, and (2) To leave
to the Court to determine in each class of case what the
47. 302 U. S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149 (1937),.
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privileges and immunities of a United States citizen are, and
whether they have been abridged by state action.4 8
The efficacy of this position both to maintain the longestablished interpretation of the amendment under the
Slaughter-House and Civil Rights cases, and at the same time
to allow a full check by the Court on infringement of civil
rights by state action is self-evident. In fact, it would seem to
pose a complete answer to the civil-righter who desires willynilly to legislate social reform without a thought for Constitutional consequences.
The cases discussed cover, generally, the problem of the
scope of the 14th amendment as relates to civil rights, and the
legislative power of the Congress in that field. The established doctrines of the Court in the problem have been set out.
The proper consideration of the question merits a hurried
glance at other decisions of the Court since the Twining casa
up to the present, however.
In 1916, in the Blue Sky cases,49 the Court held that the
States are free to act even in the field of interstate commerce
(until such time as the Congress acts under its power), and
that it is clearly within the police power of the States to determine what is best in the matter of regulations to promote
economic security.
In 1923 the Court declared that citizens and aliens alike
are protected by the 14th amendment from "arbitrary and
capricious" state action as concerns their property rights,
but that the amendment did not take away state police
powers . . . "and in the exercise of such powers the state has
wide discretion in determining its own public policy and what
measures are necessary for its own protection and properly
to promote the safety, peace and good order of its people." 50
That the Court has continued steadfastly to uphold the
rights of minorities where discrimination fell within the purview of the 14th amendment was shown again in 1927. In
48. See generally on this point, Greenbacker, The 14th Amendment,
Challenged, 36 Geotwn. L. Rev. 398 (1948); and Hutchinson, Due
Process and the Bill of Rights-Self-Incrimination, 46 Mich. L. Rev.

372 (1948).
49. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. (Etc.), 242 U. S. 599, 37 S. Ct. 217
(1916).
50. Cited with approval in Lacoste v. Department of Conservation,

263 U. S. 545, 44 S. Ct. 186 (1924).
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Nixon v. Herndon,51 the Court reversed a dismissal by the
District court where a Negro brought an action (under the
Civil Rights statutes conferring jurisdiction on the District
court) for damages against Texas election officials who had
denied him the right to vote in primary elections. Mr. Justice
Holmes said the amendment declares: "that the law in the
States shall be the same for the black as for the white," and
the Texas statute barring Negroes from the vote in Democratic party primaries was invalid, citing Buchanan v. Warley, 52 and Vick Co. v. Hopkins.53
In 192754 and in 192855 the Court again asserted that the
states are free to pass proper regulatory laws, even though
burdensome on one class of citizens, so long as they rest on a
reasonable basis and are not arbitrary. As was said in the
Liggett case:
"The police power may be executed in the form of state
legislation when otherwise the effect may be to invade
rights guaranteed by the 14th amendment only when
such legislation bears a real and substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of
the general welfare."
See especially the highly readable concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Whitney case, discussing the civil
rights afforded protection by the 14th amendment (and this
without the addition of federal police legislation). It was also
pointed out in the Liggett case that the party discriminated
against may enjoin the action of the state. No more speedy
remedy could be devised in a dozen new federal civil rights
acts.
It was not until the impact of the social conflict of the
1930's and the armed conflict of the 1940's that the Court was
called upon again to deal with a rising tide of civil rights
cases. Indeed the current flux of civil rights litigation and
agitation is but a reflection of the unsettled times. The problem is more pressing today that at any time since the. years
51. 273 U. S. 536, 47 S. Ct. 446 (1927).
52. 245 U. S. 60, 38 S. Ct. 16 (1917).
53. 118 U. S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064 (1886).
54. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641 (1927).
55. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 49 S. Ct. 57 (1928).
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following the Civil War, and the fact that the older doctrines
are weathering the storm (even if by 5-to-4 decision) is a
powerful argument for their validity and against attempting to "expand" the amendment by legislation.
In 1939 the Court announced a strong decision upholding
the right to freedom of speech and assembly as against state
invasion in Mayor Hague v. C. 1. 0. 06 The obvious Infringement on civil rights perpetrated by the New Jersey Mayor's
intimidation and ejection of labor organizers from "his" city
was sternly censured by the Court. The Court declared that
the rights of United States citizens under the 14th amendment are now ascendant to the secondary rights of state citizenship, and that rights to free speech and freedom of assembly are secured to citizens, by the "privileges and immunities" clause of the 14th amendment. Mr. Justice Butler, speaking for the Court, went into some detail of the discussion
of the federal Civil Rights acts as they now stand and determined that the C. I. 0. suit to enjoin the activities of
Mayor Hague was properly brought.
Mr, Justice Stone in a separate opinion stated that he was
unable to agree that the freedoms of speech and assembly were
protected as against state action under the privileges and immunities clause, which would require a broader interpretation of the amendment than the settled decisions justify (and
would imply Congressional and judicial control over the states
in respect to protecting those rights.) 58 He preferred to stand
by the settled (and sounder it seems) position that the relief
was provided to the complainants because they were denied
56. 307 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939).
57., Civil Redress for Deprivation of Civil Rights, or for conspiracy
to deprive persons of those rights is made available to the injured party
by statute: 8 USCA. 43, 47. Criminal Redress for Deprivation of Civil
Rights or for conspiracy to deprive persons of those rights (including
intimidation at the polls) is provided by statute: 18 TJSCA 51, et seq.
Jurisdictionof Civil Rights cases is conferred upon the District Court
(both criminal and civil, at law and in equity) by statute; 28 USCA
41 (12, 13, 14).
These statutes are largely unchanged from the original acts (see
Note 18 -supra) and have served since 1-66 to protect the civil rights of
those under protection of the United States without destroying the
harmony of our dual form of government,
58. See Justice Stone's summary of the problem in the footnotes to
his separate opinion, 307 U. S. at pp. 519, 52Q, 59 S. Ct. at p. 966.
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the protections required by the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of the amendment, without enlarging the
:privileges and immunities clause.
Also in 1939 the Court set the pattern that was to follow
in. the many war-born "Jehovah's Witness" cases by
declaring :59
"Although a municipality may enact regulations in the interest of the public health, safety, welfare or convenience,
these may not abridge the individual liberties secured by
the Constitution to those who wish to speak, write, print
or circulate information or opinion."
Then the "liberal" Court displayed that the proper exer,else of police power by states is still free from interference
-under the doctrines established by the years. Upholding the
validity of a Virginia regulatory statute, 60 the Court declared,
"It is not our province to measure the social advantage to
Virginia of regulating the conduct of insurance companies
-within her borders . .."
In 1941, the Court denied a California court the power
to jail for contempt for criticism of the court's opinion or
'holding (which did not actually interfere with trial of the
case). The court said that under the police power, a state
-may justify suppression even of free speech which is protected by the 14th amendment, but " . . . there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free
-speech is practiced, and there must be reasonable ground to
61
'believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.
In 1946, in another of the Jehovah's Witness cases, 62 the
Court declared that the rights of free speech, press and assembly guaranteed as against the federal government by the
1st amendment were extended as against state infringement
'by the 14th. It is interesting to note here that the state
"agent" was a mining company which owned and ran the
town with state approval, yet the amendment's protection
-was extended. 59. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147 (1939).
60. Ozborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53, 60 S. Ct. 758 (1940).
61. Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190 (1941).
also Sellers v. Johnson, CCA 8, 163 F (2d) 877 (1947).

See

62. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 66 S. Ct. 276 (1946).
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A further illustration of the adaptability of the 14th
amendment to the changing scene is found in the Caotholic
School Bus case decided in 1947.63 Although the chief issue

was separation of state and church under the Constitution,
both majority opinion and dissent found no problem in applying the prohibitions concerning religion in the 1st amendment to the States by way of the 14th amendment. Clearly
this accepted absorption has come by way of the "fundamental" inclusions doctrine of Twining v. New Jersey and Palko
v. Connecticut, supra.
The Adamson decision, supra, was also decided recently,
bringing into sharp focus again the problem of the scope of
the 14th amendment at a time when the clamor is high to
broaden its scope by federal legislation, if not by Court decision.
The practice of a state (California) under a statute again
(as in the Twining and Palko cases) allowed a comment on
the accused's failure to testify and allowed evidence to be
brought in of previous convictions, concededly improper in
federal jurisdictions under the 5th amendment. The Court
again decided that the "privileges and immunities" of United
States citizens were those fundamental freedoms necessary
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, refusing to accede
to the argument that all the provisions of the Bill of Rights
must be included in those rights protected by the 14th amendment. Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out that, as in the
past, the "due process" requirements would protect the citizen from improper state action, and would guarantee a fair
trial, without the danger accompanying an enlargement of
the scope of the 14th amendment. He declared: 64
"Between the incorporation of the 14th Amendment into
the Constitution and the beginning of the present membership of the Court-a period of 70 years-the scope
of that Amendment was passed upon by 43 judges. Of
all these judges only one, who may respectfully be called
an eccentric exception, ever indicated the belief that the
14th Amendment was a shorthand summary of the first
eight amendments theretofore limiting only the Federal
63. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504 (1947).,
64. 332 U. S. 46, at p. 62, 67 S. Ct. 1672, at p. 1680.
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Government, and that due process incorporated those
eight amendments as restrictions upon the powers of
the States. Among these judges were not only those who
would have to be included among the greatest in the history of the Court, but-it is especially relevant to note
-they included those whose services in the cause of
human rights and the spirit of freedom are the most
conspicuous in our history. It is not invidious to single
out Miller, Davis, Bradley, Waite, Matthew, Gray, Fuller,
Holmes, Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo (to speak only of
the dead) as judges who were alert in safeguarding and
promoting the interests of liberty and human dignity
through law. But they were also judges mindful of the
relation of our federal system to a progressively democratic society and therefore duly regardful of the scope
of authority that was left to the States even after the
Civil War. And so they did not find that the 14th Amendment, concerned as it was with matters fundamental to
the pursuit of justice, fastened upon the States procedural arrangements which, in the language of Mr. Justice
Cardozo, only those who are 'narrow or provincial' would
deem essential to 'a fair and enlightened system of
justice'."
Although the array of cases set out here, many of them
involving technical points of no seeming relation to the issue
discussed, may seem a haphazard selection, it is submitted
that they present an accurate summary of the development
of the nation's civil rights law in the 80 years since the
Civil War.
Through them all runs a strong thread of determination
that this nation shall grow in human liberties and social
progress, and that the rights of minorities shall be firmly
maintained. Interwoven with that thread is an equal determination that our democratic dual system of government shall
not be sacrificed to satisfy a desire for legislated social
progress.
Mr. Justice Strong said in Strauder v. West Virginia,
supra:

"The colored race, as a race, was abject and ignorant, and
in that condition was unfitted to command the respect
of those who had superior intelligence. Their training had

Published by Scholar Commons, 1949

19

264

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [1949], Art. 4

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY

left them mere children, and as such they needed the protection which a wise government extends to those who
are unable to protect themselves. They especially needed
protection against unfriendly action in the States where
they were resident. It was in view of these considerations that the 14th Amendment was adopted.., and enforced by legislation."
The decisions of the Court swiftly marked out the boundaries of that protection. Cutting out the invalid segregation
and police power provisions of the acts, it gave the oppressed
Negro (as well as all other minorities) the maximum of protection and aid without a destruction of our governmental
system with its protection against centralized tyranny. No
other race in the world's history has attained the astonishing
progress in the short span of 80 years that has attended the
Negro race under our law. That minority groups in America
are respected and protected as nowhere else on the globe is
axiomatic. To endanger our sound governmental system and
call down upon our heads the strife of enforced social revolution, by federal legislation, would seem an ill-advised solution to those problems of minority protection which time and
the courts seem fully capable of solving.
As Mr. Justice Bradley declared in the Civil Rights cases,

supra:
"When a.man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid
of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in
the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of
a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of
the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man,
are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other
men's rights are protected."
It is submitted that the lesson of these cogent words has
long been drowned in the torrent of agitation for civil rights
legislation. The public generally seem to have become so "sold"
on the proposition that the nation requires more civil rights
legislation-any type, just so it is labeled civil rights-that
they forget the great danger that they will thereby sacrifice
their own rights.
It is not insignificant that those loudest in the demand
for legislation extending the Congressional power over the
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states, are often found to be identified with groups whose
desire to assume control of our government would be greatly
facilitated by a centralization of the polihe power in one place.
If these words seem melodramatic look again at the words
of the Court set out above, always insisting that the Constitutional system be preserved at all hazards.
The conclusion seems inescapable that the nation's present system of civil rights law, built by constitutional amendment, statute and decision, is fitting and efficient to promote
the progress of minorities in our society with a minimum
of strife and with safety to our priceless dual form of constitutional government.
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